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The Cybersecurity Privilege 
JEFF KOSSEFF1 
 Cybersecurity threats – such as denial of service attacks, data 
theft, website defacement, and other incidents – cost U.S. companies 
billions of dollars a year in lost business, remediation, and other 
expenses.  Cyberattacks also compromise individuals’ privacy and 
reduce public confidence in the Internet and networked computing.  
Companies recognize these threats, and are increasingly relying on 
cybersecurity professionals to protect their networks and systems 
from hackers, and mitigate damage after data security incidents. 
 Unfortunately, U.S. evidentiary law discourages companies from 
hiring cybersecurity professionals to protect their networks and 
remediate security incidents.  The work of cybersecurity professionals 
– unlike that of attorneys, accountants, and therapists – is not directly 
covered by a privilege under federal or state law.  Accordingly, 
cybersecurity professionals’ work product and communications is, by 
default, discoverable in litigation or regulatory proceedings.  
Cybersecurity work often relies on highly confidential information 
about a company’s network vulnerabilities, and therefore the 
disclosure of the work product or communications could be useful to 
plaintiff’s lawyers or regulators after a data security incident.  To 
protect against this risk, companies attempt to cover their 
cybersecurity professionals’ communications and work product under 
an existing evidentiary privilege, such as the attorney-client privilege 
or work product doctrine.  However, such privileges are an uneasy fit 
for some cybersecurity work, particularly prophylactic measures that 
are not directly tied to ongoing or potential litigation.  In other words, 
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current evidentiary law discourages companies from investing in the 
services necessary to prevent cyberattacks from occurring. 
 In this Article, I propose the creation of a stand-alone privilege for 
cybersecurity work.  Courts should recognize a common-law 
cybersecurity privilege under Federal Rule of Evidence 501, just as 
they have recognized the attorney-client privilege, psychotherapist 
privilege, and priest-penitent privilege.  There is a significant public 
interest in encouraging companies to hire professionals to assess 
cybersecurity and close potential gaps.  Companies will be more likely 
to make such investments if they have some assurance that the 
cybersecurity professionals’ communications and work product will 
not later be discovered in court.  Although courts are hesitant to create 
new privileges, the strong societal interest in promoting cybersecurity 
justifies the creation of a new common-law privilege.  Alternatively, 
legislators should consider creating a statutory privilege for 
cybersecurity professionals, as they have for journalists, accountants, 
and others whose work serves the public interest.   
INTRODUCTION 
 Large-scale data security breaches, such as the late 2014 hack of 
Sony,2 have upended companies’ operations, exposed the personal 
information of millions of individuals, and caused widespread political 
and economic disruption.  In addition to high-profile breaches, 
companies of all sizes and industries experience data security 
incidents that do not receive as much attention, but threaten their 
business secrets and consumers’ personal information.3   
 Recognizing these significant threats, companies increasingly are 
hiring cybersecurity professionals to prevent and remediate data 
security incidents.  Cybersecurity professionals play a preventative 
role by ensuring that computer systems, networks, hardware, and 
service providers are equipped with effective safeguards from attack, 
and they also help companies develop internal use policies and train 
employees.4  Cybersecurity professionals also remediate harm after a 
 
 
 
 
2 See, e.g., Mark Seal, An Exclusive Look at Sony’s Hacking Saga, VANITY FAIR (Feb. 4, 
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3 See, e.g., Bill Hardekopf, The Big Data Breaches of 2014, FORBES (Jan. 13, 2015). 
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data security incident by investigating the cause of the breach and 
securing the information assets from further attack.5 
 Unfortunately, cybersecurity professionals’ work product – and 
their direct communications with clients – are not, by default, 
protected by discovery through an evidentiary privilege.6  Although 
the common law provides privileges to a number of professions that 
deliver critical services, such as attorneys and therapists,7 no such 
privilege directly applies to cybersecurity professionals. 
 The lack of a privilege for cybersecurity work product and 
communications creates significant legal exposure for companies that 
seek to protect their systems and repair vulnerabilities.  Data security 
incidents are increasingly the cause of multi-million-dollar class 
action lawsuits under a variety of state common law claims and 
statutes.  Moreover, state and federal regulators are increasingly 
bringing enforcement actions and lawsuits against companies that 
they believe failed to take proper steps to protect consumers’ personal 
information.8   Cybersecurity professionals’ work product often 
contains candid assessments of vulnerabilities, and therefore could be 
very damaging evidence against the client in litigation or a regulatory 
enforcement action.9  This creates a disincentive to hire cybersecurity 
professionals to assess and remediate vulnerabilities in companies’ 
information technology infrastructure.  Ultimately, this results in 
more cybersecurity vulnerabilities throughout the private sector, an 
outcome that clearly is not in the public interest.   
 In recent years, companies have attempted to solve this problem 
by engaging cybersecurity professionals through attorneys, providing 
some coverage of the work product through the attorney client 
 
 
 
 
5 Id.  
6 See Section II, infra. 
7 See generally Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996). 
8 See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2015).  
9 Cybersecurity consultants frequently offer candid, in-depth assessments of potential 
clients’ vulnerabilities, see, e.g., Is your Web site fully protected?, ZENEDGE, 
https://www.zenedge.com/cybersecurity-vulnerability-and-threat-assessment (last visited 
Mar. 7, 2016) (“Leveraging industry-standard threat assessment techniques to analyze 
risks and vulnerabilities, our ZENEDGE Vulnerability and Threat Assessment process 
evaluates the potential vulnerabilities facing your web properties and web applications to 
deliver an objective third-party threat assessment, complete with in-depth analysis and 
recommendations for hardening cybersecurity.”).  
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privilege and the work product doctrine.10  However, this is only a 
partial solution, as the scope of the privilege for attorneys often does 
not fully encompass the work of cybersecurity professionals.  Litigants 
are increasingly challenging companies’ attempts to cover the work 
product and communications of cybersecurity professionals under the 
attorney-client privilege.  Moreover, tying the privilege to attorney-
related matters discourages companies from taking proactive 
cybersecurity measures before they face significant legal risk.  
 In this article, I argue for the creation of a standalone privilege – 
either through common law or by statute – for the work and 
communications of cybersecurity professionals.  Courts are 
understandably hesitant to create new common-law privileges.11  
However, this is an extraordinary case in which a new privilege is 
justified, due to the sensitive nature of data gathered, produced, and 
created by cybersecurity professionals, as well as the crucial role that 
they play in protecting businesses and consumers.  
 Part I of this article outlines the challenges that companies face in 
securing their networks and systems, the roles that cybersecurity 
professionals play in helping companies prepare for and respond to 
cybersecurity events, and the types of work product and 
communications that cybersecurity professionals produce.  Part II 
provides an overview of the current evidentiary protections for 
cybersecurity work product and communications through the 
attorney-client privilege and work client doctrine.  It also examines 
the results in recent cases in which companies have attempted to 
prevent the disclosure of cybersecurity communications and work 
product in litigation, and argues that these cases demonstrate the 
inadequacy of the attorney-client privilege for cybersecurity.  Part III 
examines the Supreme Court’s standard for creating a common-law 
privilege under Federal Rule of Evidence 501, and explains why a 
cybersecurity privilege would satisfy that standard.  Alternatively, I 
argue, there is sufficient public interest to justify Congress and state 
legislatures enacting a statutory cybersecurity privilege.  Part IV 
suggests legal rules and standards to ensure balanced and fair 
application of a cybersecurity privilege, including methods by which 
 
 
 
 
10 See Section II.A, infra.  
11 See United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950) (“[W]e start with the primary 
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courts could identify cybersecurity professionals who would be 
covered by the privilege. 
I. THE GROWING IMPORTANCE OF CYBERSECURITY PROFESSIONALS 
 Before exploring the reasons that courts should protect the 
confidentiality of cybersecurity work and communications, it is 
important to understand what cybersecurity is, and why cybersecurity 
has become increasingly important to businesses in recent years.   
 Cybersecurity is a relatively new concept for courts.  Indeed, few 
U.S. courts have used the term, and none have articulated a common 
definition for cybersecurity.12  The Department of Homeland 
Security’s National Initiative for Cybersecurity Careers and Studies 
(NICCS) offers a fairly comprehensive definition of cybersecurity: 
“[t]he activity or process, ability or capability, or state whereby 
information and communications systems and the information 
contained therein are protected from and/or defended against 
damage, unauthorized use or modification, or exploitation.”13  That 
definition, which is based on various documents and policies issued by 
Department of Homeland Security, National Institutes of Standards 
and Technology, and the White House, makes clear that cybersecurity 
includes the protection of both systems and information. This 
definition also correctly makes clear that cybersecurity is different 
from privacy, which NICCS defines as the “assurance that the 
confidentiality of, and access to, certain information about an entity is 
protected.”14  Although cybersecurity can help to protect individuals’ 
privacy, the terms are not interchangeable.  Privacy involves assuring 
individuals that their personal data is protected, while cybersecurity 
more broadly encompasses the steps that a company takes to protect 
its systems and the information that is stored on those systems.  If a 
company does not enact the necessary cybersecurity safeguards, then 
its consumers’ and employees’ privacy may be more likely to be at risk. 
Accordingly, companies are increasingly focusing on cybersecurity.  
 
 
 
 
12 The first published U.S. court opinion to use the term “cybersecurity” was Pisciotta v. 
Old National Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629 (7th Cir. 2007), which, in a footnote, cited an article 
noting “the propriety of the analogy between toxic torts and cybersecurity breaches.” 
13 Explore Terms: A Glossary of Common Cybersecurity Terminology, NATIONAL 
INITIATIVE FOR CYBERSECURITY CAREERS AND STUDIES, http://niccs.us-cert.gov/glossary 
(last visited Mar. 7, 2016). 
14 Id. 
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 To demonstrate businesses’ increased need for cybersecurity, Part 
A of this Section provides an overview of the scope of the 
cybersecurity challenges that businesses face, and the economic harm 
that data breaches and other incidents can cause.  Part B of this 
Section explains the work that cybersecurity professionals do to 
prevent incidents from occurring and remediate damage after 
incidents have taken place.  
A. Increase in Cybersecurity Incidents 
 It is rare for a week to go by without a headline about data 
breaches at large companies or government agencies.  In a 2014 
survey by the Ponemon Institute, 43 percent of companies reported 
data breaches in the previous year, up from 33 in 2013.15 According to 
the Identity Theft Resource Center, the number of U.S. data breaches 
rose by 27.5 percent between 2013 and 2014.16  
 Data breaches can be incredibly costly for companies. In its annual 
report about data security, the Ponemon Institute found that the 
average total cost of a single U.S. data breach was $6.53 million in 
2014, up from $5.85 million in 2013.17  The average cost per 
compromised U.S. record was $217, up from $201 a year earlier.18  
Ponemon estimates that approximately 26 percent of the costs are 
attributed to detection and escalation services, such as forensics, 
audits, and crisis management.19  Approximately 28 percent of the 
costs are associated with ex-post response, such as help desk, 
remediation, and legal expenses.  Less than 5 percent are attributed to 
the costs of notifying individuals and regulators of the breaches.20  The 
 
 
 
 
15 Is Your Company Ready for a Big Data Breach?: The Second Annual Study on Data 
Breach Preparedness, PONEMON INSTITUTE RESEARCH REPORT, Sept. 2014.  
16 Identity Theft Resource Center Breach Report Hits Record High in 2014, IDENTITY 
THEFT RESOURCE CENTER (Jan. 12, 2015), http://www.idtheftcenter.org/ITRC-Surveys-
Studies/2014databreaches.html.  
17 2015 Cost of Data Breach Study: Global Analysis, PONEMON INSTITUTE RESEARCH 
REPORT, May 2015, at 7. 
18 Id. at 5.   
19 Id. at 17. 
20 Id. 
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remainder -- more than 41 percent -- comes from business that was 
lost due to the breach.21  
 Indeed, the litigation costs after data breaches are unpredictable 
and can reach many millions of dollars in attorney fees and 
settlements.  For instance, after more than 77 million PlayStation user 
records were hacked in 2011, Sony settled a class action lawsuit for 
$15 million.22  Similarly, after a 2009 data breach involving 460,000 
consumers, healthcare company AvMed settled a class action lawsuit 
for $3.1 million.23 
 To fully understand the cost of data breaches, consider the 2013 
attack on the payment systems of Target.  During the holiday 
shopping season, hackers installed malware on Target’s internal sales 
network by logging in with credentials used by one of Target’s heating, 
ventilation, and cooling contractors.24  This led to the exposure of tens 
of millions of customers’ personal information, including credit card 
numbers.25  The company’s holiday sales fell below expectations, and 
the company attributed the decline to the data breach.26  The next 
 
 
 
 
21 Id. 
22 Timothy J. Seppala, The Claim Process for Sony’s $15 Million PSN Breach Lawsuit 
Starts Now, ENGADGET (Jan. 24, 2015), https://www.engadget.com/2015/01/24/psn-
breach-payment-form/.  
23 Marianne Kolbasuk McGee, Settlement in AvMed Breach Suit: Class Action Settlement 
Offers Payments for Lack of Security, DATA BREACH TODAY (Oct. 31, 2013), 
http://www.databreachtoday.com/settlement-in-avmed-breach-suit-a-6188.  
24 Jaikumar Vijayan, Target Breach Happened Because of a Basic Network Segmentation 
Error, COMPUTERWORLD (Feb. 6, 2014), 
http://www.computerworld.com/article/2487425/cybercrime-hacking/target-breach-
happened-because-of-a-basic-network-segmentation-error.html; see also Mary A. Chaput, 
Calculating the Colossal Cost of a Data Breach, CFO (Mar. 24, 2015), 
http://ww2.cfo.com/data-security/2015/03/calculating-colossal-cost-data-breach/ (“The 
asking price in health-care data breach lawsuits has typically been in the $1,000 per victim 
range, but few have come to fruition due to the courts’ reluctance to confer standing on the 
potential of future harm — until now. In the Adobe Systems breach case, the U.S. District 
Court recently found that such potential future harm is sufficient to allow a putative class 
of plaintiffs to proceed in federal court.”).  
25 Meagan Clark, Timeline of Target’s Data Breach and Aftermath: How Cybertheft 
Snowballed for the Giant Retailer, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TIMES (May 5, 2014), 
http://www.ibtimes.com/timeline-targets-data-breach-aftermath-how-cybertheft-
snowballed-giant-retailer-1580056.  
26 Id.  
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month, Target laid off nearly 500 headquarters employees.27  
Congress held hearings about the breach.  Through the end of 2014, 
Target accumulated $252 million in expenses related to the breach, 
though those costs were partly offset by $90 million in insurance 
payments.28  Those expenses did not include potential judgments or 
settlements in the numerous class action lawsuits that customers and 
others filed against Target as a result of the breach.29 
 Some companies are forced to shutter operations entirely after 
data breaches.  According to the House Small Business Subcommittee 
on Health and Technology, nearly 60 percent of small businesses are 
forced to shut down within six months of a data security incident.30  
For instance, in 2014, hackers deleted a great deal of sensitive data 
from the servers of Code Spaces, a software-as-a-service provider, 
forcing the small company to go out of business within a week.31  And 
in 2015, Altegrity, a background investigations firm, filed for 
bankruptcy in 2015 after a state-sponsored cyberattack.32  
 Cybersecurity also is a significant problem for government 
agencies, as seen in the 2015 breach of millions of employees’ data at 
the Office of Personnel Management.  According to a report from the 
Government Accountability Office, 67,168 cyber incidents harmed 
federal government computer systems in 2014, an increase of more 
than 1,000 percent in eight years.33 
 
 
 
 
27 Id.  
28 Ingrid Lunden, Target Says Credit Card Data Breach Cost It $162M in 2013-14, 
TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 25, 2015), https://techcrunch.com/2015/02/25/target-says-credit-
card-data-breach-cost-it-162m-in-2013-14/.  
29 Id. 
30 Press Release, Collins Subcommittee Examines Small Business Cyber-Security 
Challenges With New Technologies, House Small Business Subcommittee on Health and 
Technology Chairman (Mar. 21, 2013), 
http://smallbusiness.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=325034#sthas
h.bKjrBI5W.dpuf.  
31 Adam Greenberg, Code Spaces Shuts Down Following DDoS Extortion, Deletion of 
Sensitive Data, SC MAGAZINE (Jun. 19, 2014), http://www.scmagazine.com/code-spaces-
shuts-down-following-ddos-extortion-deletion-of-sensitive-data/article/356774/.  
32 Linda Sandler and Andrea Tan, Altegrity Files Bankruptcy After ‘State-Sponsored’ 
Breach, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 8, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-02-
09/altegrity-files-for-bankruptcy-after-losing-vetting-contracts.  
33 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-290, HIGH RISK SERIES: AN UPDATE, 241 
(Feb. 2015), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/668415.pdf.  
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 These statistics demonstrate that cybersecurity is a real and 
growing problem for organizations large and small, public and private.  
For good reason, President Barack Obama identified cyber threats as 
“one of the most serious economic national security challenges that we 
face as a nation.”34 
B. Emergence of the Cybersecurity Profession 
 Recognizing the huge threats that security incidents can pose for 
businesses, a cybersecurity industry has quickly emerged.  The global 
cybersecurity industry is estimated to generate $75.4 billion in 2015, 
and is projected to grow to $170 billion in 2020.35  Although the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics does not track the number of cybersecurity 
professionals, the demand for skilled cybersecurity labor reportedly 
has surged in recent years.36  
 Companies use cybersecurity forensics firms for two general 
purposes: (1) preventing cybersecurity incidents; and (2) remediating 
and mitigating harm after a data security incident already has 
occurred.  Both tasks can be costly and time-consuming, and require 
companies to provide cybersecurity consultants with broad access to 
information about data processing and storage.  This data is highly 
sensitive and could be damaging to the company, particularly during a 
regulatory investigation or litigation arising from an alleged data 
security incident.  
 Among the most common steps that companies take to prevent 
cybersecurity incidents is developing an incident response plan.37  The 
 
 
 
 
34 Remarks by the President at the Cybersecurity and Consumer Protection Summit (Feb. 
13, 2015) (“When companies get hacked, Americans’ personal information, including their 
financial information, gets stolen. Identity theft can ruin your credit rating and turn your 
life upside down.”).  
35 Tara Seals, Cybersecurity Spending to Hit $170Bn by 2020, INFOSECURITY MAGAZINE 
(July 13, 2015).  
36 Martin C. Libicki et al., Hackers Wanted: An Examination of the Cybersecurity Labor 
Market, RAND CORPORATION (“There is a general perception that there is a shortage of 
cybersecurity professionals within the United States, and a particular shortage of these 
professionals within the federal government, working on national security as well as 
intelligence. Shortages of this nature complicate securing the nation’s networks and may 
leave the United States ill-prepared to carry out conflict in cyberspace.”).  
37 Tucker Bailey et al., How Good is Your Cyberincident Response Plan?, MCKINSEY & CO. 
(Dec. 2013), 
http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/business_technology/how_good_is_your_cyberincid
ent_response_plan.  
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main goal of such plans is to minimize the damage caused by a data 
security incident and build confidence among the public and 
regulators.38  To develop an incident response plan, cybersecurity 
professionals must first conduct interviews and review information 
technology functions throughout the company to understand the 
systems and data flows and identify the information and systems that 
are most vulnerable to a cyberattack.39  Once companies have 
developed incident response plans, they run table-top exercises in 
which employees and managers throughout the company respond to a 
simulated data security incident.  A cybersecurity professional 
typically oversees the process and provides feedback to help the 
company hone its response.40  
 Relatedly, companies engage cybersecurity professionals to 
develop information security policies.  Like the incident response 
plan, the goal of security policies is to prepare a company for a 
cybersecurity incident.41  Among the information security policies that 
companies consider adopting are policies that cover encryption, 
acceptable Internet use, password protection, remote access, vendor 
management, and monitoring.42  To develop information security 
policies – and the programs to implement these policies – 
cybersecurity professionals first must comprehensively examine and 
understand a company’s systems and networks, as well as the 
 
 
 
 
38 Id.   
39 Id.   
40 See Tucker Bailey and Josh Brandley, Ten Steps to Planning and Effective Cyber-
Incident Response, HARV. BUS. REV. (July 1, 2013) (“The best-prepared organizations 
routinely conduct war games to stress-test their plans, increasing managers’ awareness and 
fine-tuning their response capabilities.”); Judy Selby and Lynn Sessions, Building a Breach 
Response Team, Before You Have a Breach, CSO (Oct. 3, 2014) (“Proactive retention of a 
breach response team provides the entity with the opportunity to engage in practice runs 
and fire drills to rehearse their response to a breach incident, which can help to identify 
communication, technical or other snags before a breach ever happens.”).  
41 R. Daniel Lee, Developing Effective Information System Security Policies, SANS 
INSTITUTE, http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/policyissues/developing-
effective-information-systems-security-policies-491 (“Unfortunately, threats do exist and 
information systems security policies are necessary to provide a framework for selecting 
and implementing countermeasures against them. An enforceable written policy helps 
ensure that everyone within the organization coherently behaves in an acceptable manner 
with respect to information security.”).  
42 Information Security Policy Templates, SANS INSTITUTE, 
https://www.sans.org/security-resources/policies (last visited Mar. 8, 2016).  
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potential technical and human vulnerabilities that could lead to a 
security incident.43 
 Companies also engage cybersecurity professionals to perform 
penetration tests, which “prove (or disprove) real-world attack vectors 
against an organization’s IT assets, data, humans, and/or physical 
security.”44  The results of these tests can help a company reconfigure 
its systems, policies, and processes to guard against security threats.45   
 Cybersecurity professionals’ second task – remediating and 
mitigating harm after a security incident – often carries more urgency 
and must begin immediately.46  Cybersecurity professionals must 
immediately gain full access to a network to determine the extent of 
the intrusion, and the necessary steps to remediate any damage and 
prevent further unauthorized access.47  The cybersecurity experts and 
lawyers must work together to determine whether they are legally 
required to notify state regulators or consumers of the breach under a 
state notification law.48  Cybersecurity professionals also collaborate 
 
 
 
 
43 Natalie Timms, Secure Networks: How to Develop an Information Security Policy, 
INFORMATIONWEEK NETWORK COMPUTING (Jan. 23, 2014) (“It’s critical to understand what 
you are trying to secure and why; if you don’t understand the underlying network, how can 
you secure it? Network addressing schemes, choice of routing protocol, and correct 
mapping of physical connections, such as switch ports to logical configurations, are basic 
components that must be understood.”).  
44 Eric Basu, What Is a Penetration Test and Why Would I Need One for My Company? 
FORBES (Oct. 12, 2013) (“A penetration test is designed to answer the question: ‘What is the 
real-world effectiveness of my existing security controls against an active, human, skilled 
attacker?’”).  
45 Id. 
46 See Karen Kent et al., Guide to Integrating Forensic Techniques into Incident Response, 
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, at 2-3 (“Practically every 
organization needs to have some capability to perform computer and network forensics. 
Without such a capability, an organization will have difficulty determining what events 
have occurred within its systems and networks, such as exposures of protected, sensitive 
data.”).  
47 Nate Lord, Data Breach Experts Share the Most Important Next Step You Should Take 
After a Data Breach in 2014-15 & Beyond, DIGITAL GUARDIAN (May 4, 2015) (“By bringing 
in an unbiased, third-party specialist, you can discover exactly what has been accessed and 
compromised, identify what vulnerabilities caused the data breach, and remediate so the 
issue doesn’t happen again in the future.”).  
48 Forty-seven states and the District of Columbia require companies to notify consumers 
or regulators of the breach of certain types of unencrypted personal information. State laws 
vary in terms of the categories of personal information that trigger the notification 
requirements. See Security Breach Notification Laws, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE 
272 I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY [Vol. 12:2 
 
 
with public affairs departments and consultants to publicly explain 
the incident in a manner that is prompt, complete, and accurate.49 
 In short, the cybersecurity profession has quickly developed as 
companies have experienced an increase in the size, frequency, and 
cost of data security incidents.  Cybersecurity professionals wear 
multiple hats, including auditor, technologist, policymaker, strategist, 
and spokesperson.  To perform such wide-ranging duties, 
cybersecurity professionals must have broad and unfettered access to 
information that a company or organization may store in a variety of 
media and formats.50  Such information may well be sensitive and 
highly confidential.  Accordingly, a company will be more likely to 
provide such broad access if it has a reasonable assurance that the 
cybersecurity professional will not be forced to reveal that information 
in court or to a regulatory agency.   
 Why should a company care about the exposure of this 
information?  Quite simply, it increases the risk of losing a civil 
lawsuit or being a target of a regulatory investigation.  For example, if 
a company experiences a data breach that leads to customers’ identity 
theft, it likely would face a wide range of lawsuits, including common-
law negligence.  The information communicated or created by its 
cybersecurity consultant – if not privileged – could be used by a 
plaintiff to establish that the company failed to exercise reasonable 
care.  
                                                                                                                   
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-
technology/security-breach-notification-laws.aspx (last visited Mar. 8, 2016). 
49 Natalie Burg, Five Lessons for Every Business From Target’s Data Breach, FORBES (Jan. 
17, 2014) (“[A] security crisis can very quickly turn into a crisis of trust and loyalty if swift 
communications and responsive customer service aren’t employed — even if the fault lies 
with the same weak credit card security used by so many other businesses.”).  
50 See NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, supra note 46 at 3-2 (“The 
increasingly widespread use of digital technology for both professional and personal 
purposes has led to an abundance of data sources. The most obvious and common sources 
of data are desktop computers, servers, network storage devices, and laptops. These 
systems typically have internal drives that accept media, such as CDs and DVDs, and also 
have several types of ports (e.g., Universal Serial Bus [USB], Firewire, Personal Computer 
Memory Card International Association [PCMCIA]) to which external data storage media 
and devices can be attached.”).  
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II. WHY EXISTING PROTECTIONS FOR CYBERSECURITY 
COMMUNICATIONS AND WORK PRODUCT ARE INADEQUATE 
 As described above, cybersecurity consultants often have access to 
incredibly sensitive information about their clients’ data security 
practices and information technology infrastructure.  Such 
information could be extremely damaging to the company in litigation 
or a regulatory investigation.  Accordingly, companies have a great 
incentive to ensure that cybersecurity consultants’ work product and 
communications are protected from disclosure under a privilege.51  
 Unfortunately, neither the common law nor statutes provide a 
privilege for the work product or communications of cybersecurity 
experts.  Instead, companies that seek to maintain the confidentiality 
of their cybersecurity work and communications often retain 
consultants through their outside counsel, because their work is more 
likely to be privileged than if it were conducted directly for the 
company.  For instance, the head of a large cyberinvestigations 
practice advises prospective clients that they should retain his firm 
through outside counsel. 52   
 Although there are no statistics or empirical studies on the 
concerns that companies have about ensuring that cybersecurity work 
is privileged, anecdotally, it often is one of the first issues that they 
address after a data breach or other incident.  As Adam Cohen, 
Managing Director at Berkley Research Group, aptly wrote recently,  
“[t]he more litigation we see in the cybersecurity realm, the more 
likely it is that joint legal-technical work in that realm is ‘in 
anticipation of litigation’ and for purposes of rendering legal advice.”53  
 
 
 
 
51 See, e.g. Stuart A. Panensky, The Use of Attorney Client Privilege for Cyber-Focused 
Risk Assessments, INSURANCE COVERAGE AND PRACTICE (Dec. 2013) (“A significant concern 
of organizations is that the written reports generated at the culmination of such a risk 
assessment, whether conducted internally or by an external party, may provide a roadmap 
for an adversary.  It is important for an organization to seek to protect such reports from 
unwanted discovery.”).  
52 See Christopher M. Matthews, Law Firms Tout Cybersecurity Cred, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 1, 
2013) (“While a forensics firm such as Kroll can detect malware, scour network-access logs 
or understand the modus operandi of a foreign hacking group, if Kroll is contracted 
directly by the company rather than by an outside lawyer, that work is unlikely to be 
protected by attorney-client privilege, he says.”). 
53 Adam Cohen, Bringing Cybersecurity Under a Protective Umbrella (of Privilege), 
INSIDECOUNSEL (Sept. 15, 2015).  
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Cohen stressed that it “is critical for lawyers to be involved in leading 
cybersecurity efforts.”54 
 The attorney-client privilege and related protections, however, do 
not fully shield cybersecurity work and communications from 
discovery.   As demonstrated below, the three most applicable 
protections – the attorney-client privilege, attorney work product 
doctrine, and non-testifying experts privilege – do not cover the full 
scope of cybersecurity professionals’ work product.  
A. Attorney-Client Privilege  
 The attorney-client privilege protects from discovery 
communications between attorneys and clients in the course of 
seeking and providing legal advice.55  The privilege is nearly absolute 
and only contains a few limited exceptions, such as instances in which 
the attorney helped the client perpetrate crime or fraud,56 or if the 
client disputes the attorney’s competence or job performance.57   
 This broad privilege is intended “to encourage full and frank 
communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby 
promote broader public interests in the observance of law and 
administration of justice.”58  The privilege “exists to protect not only 
the giving of professional advice to those who can act on it but also the 
giving of information to the lawyer to enable him to give sound and 
informed advice.”59 
 
 
 
 
54 Id. 
55 Upjohn Co. v. Unites States, 449 U.S. 383, 388 (1981). 
56 United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 563 (1989) (“It is the purpose of the crime-fraud 
exception to the attorney-client privilege to assure that the seal of secrecy between lawyer 
and client does not extend to communications made for the purpose of getting advice for 
the commission of a fraud or crime.”) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
57 United States v. Pinson, 584 F.3d 972 (10th Cir. 2009) (“The theoretical basis for the 
assertion that raising an ineffective-assistance claim waives attorney-client privilege is the 
exception to the privilege that applies when a litigant chooses to place privileged 
communications directly in issue.”).  
58 Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 388. 
59 Id. at 384.  
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 Although the attorney-client privilege is absolute, it only covers 
certain types of communications.60 The specific elements of the 
privilege vary slightly by jurisdiction, but the following Ninth Circuit 
summary generally is an accurate illustration of the privilege’s scope 
of coverage: 
(1) When legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a 
professional legal adviser in his or her capacity as such, 
(3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) 
made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are, at the 
client's instance, permanently protected (7) from 
disclosure by the client or by the legal adviser (8) 
unless the protection be waived.61 
 The privilege, therefore, protects communications from the client 
to the attorney – or from the attorney to the client – that are 
exchanged for the purpose of rendering legal advice. The privilege 
protects communications, and does not protect the evidence 
underlying the communications.  For instance, suppose a company is 
reviewing its server logs and discovers an apparent breach.  The 
company’s CIO immediately emails a description of the apparent 
breach to the company’s outside counsel.  Although the CIO’s email to 
the attorney may be privileged, the server’s logs would not be 
privileged. 
 Additionally, the attorney-client privilege only applies to 
communications that seek or provide legal advice. For instance, if a 
company’s lawyers advise on and help implement a business 
transaction, only the legal advice that they provide will be privileged.  
Any “business advice” likely will fall outside of the scope of the 
privilege, though courts may disagree as to whether a specific 
communication is legal or business advice. 62   Applying this 
 
 
 
 
60 See generally Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599 (2009).  
61 United States v. Martin, 278 F.3d 988, 999 (9th Cir. 2002). 
62 United States v. ChevronTexaco, 241 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1069 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (“Because 
the purported privileged communications involve attorneys who apparently performed the 
dual role of legal and business advisor, assessing whether a particular communication was 
made for the purpose of securing legal advice (as opposed to business advice) becomes a 
difficult task.”); Cuno, Inc. v. Pall Corp., 121 F.R.D. 198, 204 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (“[w]here a 
lawyer mixes legal and business advice the communication is not privileged ‘unless the 
communication is designed to meet problems which can fairly be characterized as 
predominantly legal’”).  
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framework, if a company emails a cybersecurity consultant with a 
question about network protection and merely CC’s the company’s 
lawyer, a court may find that the communication was unrelated to 
legal advice, and therefore not protected by the attorney-client 
privilege.  
 Moreover, if a third party receives the communication, a court 
may find that the attorney-client privilege does not apply in that 
situation.63   However, communications may still be protected if they 
include non-lawyers who are assisting the lawyer in the 
representation.  For instance, the communications of an accountant or 
translator working for a law firm may be protected by the privilege.  
As Judge Friendly wrote a half-century ago, “[w]hat is vital to the 
privilege is that the communication be made in confidence for the 
purpose of obtaining legal advice from the lawyer.”64  Similarly, the 
attorney-client privilege covers consultants who perform work under 
the supervision of attorneys, if that work is conducted as part of the 
attorney’s representation of clients.65  
 Accordingly, if a cybersecurity professional helps an attorney 
provide legal advice to a client, those communications may be covered 
by the attorney-client privilege.  However, the attorney-client privilege 
is of limited use for a good deal of the work that cybersecurity 
professionals perform.  Perhaps the largest obstacle for the purposes 
of cybersecurity consulting is the requirement that the 
communications relate to legal advice.66  For instance, an email that 
describes the result of a network vulnerability test, for example, likely 
would not qualify as legal advice. Even if a cybersecurity professional 
is supervised by an attorney, there is no guarantee that the 
professional’s communications with the attorney or client would be 
protected under the attorney-client privilege.  
 
 
 
 
63 See Cavallaro v. United States, 284 F.3d 236, 237 (1st Cir. 2002) (“The presence of third 
parties during an attorney-client communication is often sufficient to undermine the ‘made 
in confidence’ requirement, or to waive the privilege[.]”) (internal citations omitted). 
64 United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 922 (2d Cir. 1961). 
65 See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. TRW, Inc., 628 F.2d 207, 212 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (“[T]he 
attorney-client privilege can attach to reports of third parties made at the request of the 
attorney or the client where the purpose of the report was to put in usable form 
information obtained from the client.”). 
66 See Kovel, 296 F.2d at 922 (“If what is sought is not legal advice but only accounting 
service . . ., or if the advice sought is the accountant's rather than the lawyer’s, no privilege 
exists.”).  
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B. Work Product Doctrine 
 The work product doctrine is more likely to cover some 
cybersecurity work that is performed at the direction of attorneys, but 
the doctrine, unlike the attorney-client privilege, is not absolute.   
 The doctrine was first articulated in 1947, when the Supreme 
Court ruled in Hickman v. Taylor67 that an attorney’s notes and 
reports based on witness interviews could not later be discovered in 
litigation involving the attorney’s client. Although the Court concluded 
that the attorney-client privilege does not protect the documents,68 it 
nonetheless denied discovery, reasoning that the request was “an 
attempt to secure the production of written statements and mental 
impressions contained in the files and the mind of the attorney . . 
.without any showing of necessity or any indication or claim that 
denial of such production would unduly prejudice the preparation of 
petitioner's case or cause him any hardship or injustice.”69 
 The Hickman work product doctrine was later codified in Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3).70  That rule provides that 
“[o]rdinarily, a party may not discover documents and tangible things 
that are prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for 
another party or its representative (including the other party’s 
attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent).”71  
However, the rule is not absolute: it allows discovery if “the party 
shows that it has substantial need for the materials to prepare its case 
and cannot, without undue hardship, obtain their substantial 
equivalent by other means”72 or if a court otherwise finds good cause 
to order the disclosure of relevant work product.73  If the Court orders 
disclosure of work product, “it must protect against disclosure of the 
 
 
 
 
67 Hickman, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).  
68 Id. at 508.  
69 Id. at 509. 
70 See United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1197 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Rule 26(b)(3) codifies 
the principles articulated in Hickman.”).  
71 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).  
72 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(A)(ii).  
73 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(A)(i).  
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mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of a 
party's attorney or other representative concerning the litigation.”74    
 The work product doctrine covers more than just communications 
that are necessary for legal advice. The doctrine protects work 
product that is prepared in anticipation of litigation or trial.  
Moreover, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 explicitly states that 
consultants’ work product may be protected, provided that it is 
prepared in anticipation of litigation. Indeed, courts have held that the 
work product doctrine applies to materials prepared by environmental 
consultants,75 medical device safety consultants,76 and insurance 
claims investigators.77 Similarly, a cybersecurity professional’s report 
might be protected by the work product doctrine.78   
 However, the exceptions to the work product doctrine limit the 
extent of the protection that it provides to cybersecurity work.  
Perhaps most importantly, is the requirement that the work product 
be prepared in anticipation of litigation or trial.  The Second Circuit, 
reflecting a common approach to the doctrine, interpreted work 
product to have been created “in anticipation of litigation” if “in light 
of the nature of the document and the factual situation in the 
particular case, the document can fairly be said to have been prepared 
or obtained because of the prospect of litigation.”79  Although this 
approach is relatively broad and could encompass large swaths of 
documents, the party asserting the work product doctrine would need 
 
 
 
 
74 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(B). 
75 Martin v. Bally’s Park Place Hotel & Casino, 983 F.2d 1252, 1260-62 (3d Cir. 1993).  
76 Ebert v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 2014 WL 1632155, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 24, 2014).  
77 Carver v. Allstate Insurance Co., 94 F.R.D. 131 (S.D. Ga. 1982). 
78 See Benjamen C. Linden et al., Use Outside Counsel to Control Data Breach Loss, 
BLOOMBERG BNA (Mar. 21, 2014) (“The work product doctrine may be an additional means 
to shield findings from a post-breach investigation during subsequent litigation.  Whereas 
the attorney-client privilege applies only to communications, work product applies broadly 
to ‘documents and tangible things that are prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial 
by or for another party or its representative (including the other party’s attorney, 
consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent).’ Thus, when investigative documents in 
the aftermath of a breach are prepared primarily in anticipation of litigation, the doctrine 
might protect them. However, when documents appear to be the product of a routine 
investigation and were not prepared primarily in anticipation of litigation, courts are much 
less likely to protect the work product doctrine.”).  
79 See United States v. Adlman, supra note 70 at 1202 (citations omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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to demonstrate that the materials were created because of potential 
litigation.  A consultant’s report about the causes of a data breach 
likely would have a greater chance of being covered by the work 
product doctrine than the consultant’s annual, routine assessment of a 
company’s cybersecurity controls.  The company would have a 
stronger argument that consultant prepared the data breach report in 
response to a real threat of actual litigation.  The annual, routine 
assessment, in contrast, is less likely to be likened to a real prospect of 
litigation.  This creates a perverse result: companies likely receive less 
protection for taking proactive measures to protect their networks 
from attacks than they do for taking remedial measures after breaches 
have occurred.   
 Moreover, even if work product was prepared in anticipation of 
litigation, a court still could require its disclosure if the court 
concludes that the party requesting the materials has demonstrated a 
substantial need or other good cause for the discovery.80  Routine 
work product is less likely to receive protection under the work 
product doctrine unless it is “core” or “opinion” work product related 
to an attorney’s conclusions or impressions about particular 
litigation.81  In the cybersecurity context, this means that a forensics 
expert’s initial evaluation of a data breach most likely could be 
discovered in subsequent litigation if the opposing party demonstrates 
substantial need or good cause.  In contrast, that consultant’s analysis 
of claims in a pending complaint arising from the data breach is more 
likely to be protected under the work product doctrine.  Again, this 
dichotomy results in cybersecurity professionals’ work receiving less 
protection if it is not related to ongoing litigation.   
 Although the work product doctrine has a broader scope than the 
attorney-client privilege, the work product doctrine is not absolute.  
Because litigants could successfully argue that a good deal of the work 
performed by cybersecurity consultants falls within one of the 
 
 
 
 
80 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(A)(i)-(ii). 
81 In re Cendant Corp. Securities Litigation, 343 F. 3d 658 (3d Cir. 2003) (“Stated 
differently, Rule 26(b)(3) establishes two tiers of protection: first, work prepared in 
anticipation of litigation by an attorney or his agent is discoverable only upon a showing of 
need and hardship; second, ‘core’ or ‘opinion’ work product that encompasses the mental 
impressions, conclusions, opinion, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative 
of a party concerning the litigation is generally afforded near absolute protection from 
discovery.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire 
Litig., 859 F.2d 1007, 1015 (1st Cir. 1988) (“Courts typically afford ordinary work product 
only a qualified immunity, subject to a showing of substantial need and hardship, while 
requiring a hardier showing to justify the production of opinion work product.”). 
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doctrine’s exceptions, companies cannot rely on the work product 
doctrine to prevent the compelled disclosure of cybersecurity material. 
C. Non-Testifying Expert Privilege 
 A third, narrower privilege prevents the compelled disclosure of 
certain non-testifying experts.  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
26(b)(4)(D) states that “a party may not, by interrogatories or 
depositions, discover facts known or opinions held by an expert 
retained or specially employed by another party in anticipation of 
litigation or to prepare for trial and who is not expected to be called as 
a witness at trial,” unless the party can demonstrate “exceptional 
circumstances under which it is impracticable for the party to obtain 
facts or opinions on the same subject by  other means.”82 The non-
testifying expert privilege is “designed to promote fairness by 
precluding unreasonable access to an opposing party's diligent trial 
preparation.”83  
 The non-testifying expert privilege is quite strong, and courts have 
interpreted the “exceptional circumstances” exception to be quite 
limited.84  However, it has limited value for cybersecurity 
investigations.  As the Ninth Circuit recently noted, the rule “shields 
only against disclosure through interrogatories and depositions[.]”85  
Accordingly, the rule would not prevent the disclosure of a report 
prepared by a cybersecurity expert; it would only prevent that expert 
from being subjected to interrogatories and depositions.  Moreover, 
like the work-product doctrine, the non-testifying expert privilege 
only applies to anticipated litigation or trial preparation.86  A routine 
cybersecurity investigation, therefore, likely would not be covered 
under this privilege.  This privilege would, however, apply to an 
incident assessment that a cybersecurity professional prepares to 
assess the merits of pending litigation.  
 
 
 
 
82 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(D).  
83 Durflinger v. Artiles, 727 F.2d 888, 891 (10th Cir. 1984). 
84 In re Shell Oil Refinery, 132 F.R.D. 437, 442 (E.D. La. 1990) (“The exceptional 
circumstances requirement has been interpreted by the courts to mean an inability to 
obtain equivalent information from other sources.”). 
85 Ibrahim v. Department of Homeland Sec., 669 F. 3d 983, 999 (9th Cir. 2012).  
86 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(D). 
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D. Genesco v. Visa: Why the Privilege System is Flawed for 
Cybersecurity 
 Few published opinions have directly addressed the application of 
the attorney-client privilege, work-product doctrine, and non-
testifying expert privilege to the work of cybersecurity professionals.  
This is not surprising; discovery disputes often are settled orally in 
discussions between the parties and magistrate judges; therefore, 
there is not a written opinion documenting many of these disputes.  
The most extensive written discussion of the application of these 
privileges to cybersecurity was in Genesco v. Visa.87 
 In that case, hackers had accessed customer payment card 
information that was stored on the network of Genesco, a retail 
chain.88  Genesco’s general counsel, Roger Sisson retained Stroz 
Friedberg, a cybersecurity consulting firm.89 Genesco’s retention 
agreement with Stroz stated that the retention was “in anticipation of 
potential litigation and/or legal or regulatory proceedings.”90 
  After consulting its own investigation, Visa assessed more than 
$13 million in fines and reimbursement assessments against two 
banks that processed Genesco’s credit card purchases, claiming that 
Genesco’s inadequate data security violated payment card data 
security standards and Visa’s operating regulations.91  Genesco, which 
had an indemnification agreement with the banks, sued Visa, 
asserting that the assessments lacked factual basis and violated 
various state laws.92  In discovery, Visa subpoenaed Stroz for 
deposition testimony and its work product related to the investigation, 
and also requested to depose Sisson and that Sisson provide 
documents related to his investigation of the incident.93   
 The court largely denied Visa’s discovery requests.  The court first 
held that the requests for Stroz’s deposition and work product is 
 
 
 
 
87 Genesco v. Visa U.S.A., 302 F.R.D. 168 (M.D. Tenn. 2014). 
88 Id. at 171. 
89 Id. at 180-81. 
90 Id. at 181. 
91 Id. at 170. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 181-82. 
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prohibited by the non-testifying expert privilege.94  Visa argued that 
Stroz was a fact witness, but the court rejected this argument, 
concluding that “the Stroz representative would necessarily be 
applying his or her specialized knowledge,” and that Visa had not 
established the “extraordinary circumstances” needed to overcome the 
non-expert witness privilege.95 
 The court also held that the attorney-client privilege and work 
product doctrine prevent the compelled disclosure of both the 
requests to Sisson and to Stroz.96  The court held that “[a]ttorney’s 
factual investigations ‘fall comfortably within the protection of the 
attorney-client privilege,’”97 and that the privilege “extends to the 
Stroz firm that assisted counsel in his investigation.”98  The court also 
recognized that the work product doctrine “attaches to an agent’s 
work under counsel’s direction.”99  The court held that the work 
product doctrine applies because “Genesco’s affidavits satisfy that the 
Stroz firm was retained in contemplation of litigation, as reflected in 
the express language of the retainer agreement.”100 
 In 2015, Visa subpoenaed IBM for work product regarding 
remedial security measures that IBM performed for Genesco after the 
breach.101  In a brief order, the court rejected this request, concluding 
that because Genesco “retained IBM to provide consulting and 
technical services so as to assist counsel in rendering legal advice[,]” 
IBM’s materials are protected by the attorney-client privilege and 
work product doctrine.102 
 
 
 
 
94 Id. at 189-90.  
95 Id. at 190 (“To accept that characterization would effectively eviscerate and undermine 
the core purpose of Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(D).”).  
96 Id. at 195.  
97 Id. at 190 (quoting Santra T.E. v. South Berwyn School Dist. 100, 600 F.3d 612, 619 (7th 
Cir. 2010)). 
98 Id. 
99 Id.   
100 Id. at 193.  
101 Genesco, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52314 (M.D. Tenn. March 24, 
2015).  
102 Id.  
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 Commentators hailed the Genesco rulings as a demonstration that 
cybersecurity work could be privileged, provided that they are 
conducted under the supervision of an attorney.  Lawyers at one large 
law firm hailed the opinion as “a roadmap for confidentiality 
protections” that “underscores legal counsel's critical role in today's 
digital economy where the question is not ‘if’ but ‘when,’ an 
organization will be breached.”103  Lawyers at another firm advised 
that the decision “demonstrates how important it is for you to 
designate experienced privacy counsel to lead cybersecurity initiatives, 
including determining proactive privacy and security measures, 
directing forensic investigations, and spearheading data breach 
response efforts.”104  A news article declared that, in light of the 
opinion, the “smart and most conservative proactive approach” to 
cybersecurity risk management is “to have the appropriate law firm 
take the lead, hire the required consultants, and have all reports, 
analysis, memos, plans and communications protected under the 
attorney-client and work product privileges.”105  
 The commentators were correct, to an extent.  The Genesco rulings 
extend the same protections to communications and work product of 
cybersecurity consultants as previous court opinions have extended to 
the work and communications of environmental consultants, product 
safety experts, and others retained and supervised by counsel for the 
purposes of providing legal advice or preparing for litigation.  The 
2015 order regarding IBM, in particular, is encouraging because IBM 
provided technical consulting to help remediate security flaws on 
Genesco’s network.  Although the court viewed these services as part 
of Genesco’s legal strategy, remedial measures for a computer network 
could have longer lasting effects that help Genesco in the future, 
entirely unrelated to the Visa litigation. 
 
 
 
 
103 Aravind Swaminathan et al., Court Says Cyber Forensics Covered by Legal Privilege, 
ORRICK (Apr. 24, 2015), https://www.orrick.com/Events-and-Publications/Pages/Court-
Says-Cyber-Forensics-Covered-by-Legal-Privilege.aspx.  
104 Communications with your Cybersecurity Consultant and Forensic Reports May Now 
Be Protected, MCDONALD HOPKINS (June 11, 2015), 
http://www.mcdonaldhopkins.com/alerts/data-privacy-and-cybersecurity-
communications-with-your-cybersecurity-consultant-and-forensice-reports-may-now-be-
protected. 
105 Denis Kleinfeld, Your Computer Will be Hacked, It’s Just a Question of When, 
NEWSMAX (May 4, 2015), http://www.newsmax.com/Finance/Kleinfeld/Cybersecurity-
Hack-Passcodes-Risk/2015/05/04/id/642323/.  
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 That said, the Genesco case also illustrates the evidentiary 
privileges’ limits for cybersecurity work.  The gravamen of Genesco’s 
argument throughout the discovery dispute was that Stroz and IBM 
were merely helping Genesco challenge the Visa fees or prepare for its 
defense in other claims related to the breach.106  Genesco framed its 
arguments as such for good reason: had it not framed the IBM and 
Stroz work as part of a legal defense strategy, the communications and 
work product likely would have been discoverable, as reflected in the 
court’s focus on the three attorney-related privileges.   
 The Genesco case reflects the perverse incentive system created by 
the current evidentiary privilege framework.  Assisting attorneys in 
litigation receives more protection from discovery than developing 
technical remediation measures that are separate from legal 
strategies.  Had Genesco’s Chief Information Officer – rather than its 
General Counsel – independently retained cybersecurity experts to 
remediate the security breaches, the communications and work 
products of those experts likely would have been subject to discovery.  
Yet it is likely that Genesco’s Chief Information Officer has a better 
understanding of the company’s networks and systems, and is 
therefore more equipped than the General Counsel to oversee 
cybersecurity consultants who are investigating and remediating 
security incidents.  However, as long as there is not a standalone 
privilege for cybersecurity work, companies will continue to be forced 
to delegate the supervision of cybersecurity work to their attorneys. 
III. THE CASE FOR A CYBERSECURITY PRIVILEGE 
 The Genesco case illustrates the need for a privilege to directly 
protect the work product and communications of cybersecurity 
professionals.  Such a privilege would allow companies to more 
quickly and flexibly respond to suspected cybersecurity threats 
without being forced to engage in formalistic – and time-consuming – 
routines to increase the chances of attorney-related privileges 
applying.  A separate privilege for cybersecurity would allow faster 
responses to data security incidents, and also would provide 
companies with more certainty that their cybersecurity work will not 
be discoverable in subsequent litigation. 
 
 
 
 
106 Opp. Brief of Genesco, Genesco, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52314 
(M.D. Tenn. March 24, 2015) (“Here, it is undisputed that IBM prepared the PCI Gap 
Assessment pursuant to an engagement by Genesco’s General Counsel for the purpose of 
assisting Genesco’s General Counsel in providing legal advice to Genesco regarding its 
legal obligation to be PCI DSS compliant.”). 
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 This section outlines the two avenues for creating a privilege – the 
common law or statute.  I review many of the other evidentiary 
privileges, and argue that the rationale for creating these privileges 
applies equally to cybersecurity work and communications.  
A. Common Law Privilege 
 Providing a common-law privilege for the work of cybersecurity 
professionals would be in line with the centuries-old tradition of 
recognizing a privilege based on public-interest considerations.  In its 
1934 opinion in Wolfle v. United States,107 the Supreme Court wrote 
that evidentiary privileges are “governed by common law principles as 
interpreted and applied by the federal courts in the light of reason and 
experience.”108 
 In 1972, the Chief Justice of the United States, based on 
recommendations from the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee 
on Rules of Evidence, attempted to override this flexible common-law 
approach by proposing nine exclusive, specific evidentiary privileges, 
such as the spousal testimonial privilege and the psychotherapist-
patient privilege.109  Congress ultimately rejected this proposal, and 
instead incorporated the Wolfle “reason and experience” approach 
into Federal Rule of Evidence 501.  The rule states: 
The common law — as interpreted by United States 
courts in the light of reason and experience — governs 
a claim of privilege unless any of the following provides 
otherwise: 
the United States Constitution; 
a federal statute; or 
rules prescribed by the Supreme Court. 
 
 
 
 
107 Wolfle, 291 U.S. 7 (1934). 
108 Id. at 12.  
109 Proposed Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates Order, 56 F.R.D. 
183 (1972); see Paul Rothstein, The Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, 62 GEO. L.J. 125, 128 (1973) (“The Rules as approved by the Supreme Court 
prescribe an exclusive list of carefully defined privileges for all federal court proceedings, 
civil and criminal, diversity and federal question.”).  
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But in a civil case, state law governs privilege regarding 
a claim or defense for which state law supplies the rule 
of decision.110 
 The Senate Judiciary Committee reasoned that its approach to 
evidentiary privileges “should be understood as reflecting the view 
that the recognition of a privilege based on a confidential relationship 
and other privileges should be determined on a case-by-case basis.”111  
As Chief Justice Berger wrote six years later, Congress adopted 
Federal Rule of Evidence 501 to “leave the door open to change.”112  
Federal Rule of Evidence 501 “did not freeze the law governing the 
privileges of witnesses in federal trials at a particular point in our 
history, but rather directed federal courts to continue the evolutionary 
development of testimonial privileges.”113 
 In Jaffee v. Redmond,114 in which the defendant in a civil suit 
successfully defeated the plaintiff’s attempt to subpoena notes from 
her counseling sessions with a licensed clinical social worker, the 
Supreme Court articulated the analysis that courts employ when 
determining whether a common-law evidentiary privilege exists.  The 
framework begins with “the primary assumption that there is a 
general duty to give what testimony one is capable of giving, and that 
any exemptions which may exist are distinctively exceptional, being so 
many derogations from a positive general rule.”115  Exceptions to this 
general rule “may be justified, however, by a public good transcending 
the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for 
ascertaining the truth.”116  
 
 
 
 
110 Fed. R. Evid. 501.  
111 S. Rep. 93-1277 at 13 (1974); see also Mila Sohoni, The Power to Privilege, 163 U. PENN. 
L. REV. 487, 494 (2015) (“By thus letting common law decisionmaking by federal courts set 
the content of federal privilege law, Congress was able to avoid the difficult task of drafting 
a set of statutory privilege rules that would please the many powerful interest groups with a 
stake in the shape of federal privilege law.”).  
112 Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980).  
113 Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
114 Jaffee, 518 U.S. 1 (1996).  
115 Id. at 9 (quoting United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950)). 
116 Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 9 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
2016] KOSSEFF 287 
 
 
 The public good served by both proactive and remedial 
cybersecurity consulting outweighs the standard assumption in 
support of compelled testimony and document disclosure.  As 
demonstrated in Part I of this Article, cybersecurity vulnerabilities are 
increasingly placing companies at significant risk of economic harm.  
Cybersecurity incidents also increasingly lead to identity theft, and 
can even lead to global political disruptions.  Accordingly, there is an 
overwhelming public interest in creating a policy framework that 
provides companies with incentives to invest significantly in 
cybersecurity.  Because cybersecurity professionals often uncover 
vulnerabilities that could be harmful to the companies in subsequent 
litigation or regulatory investigations, current evidentiary law 
provides them with a disincentive to engage cybersecurity consultants.  
 The use of the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine, 
and non-testifying expert privilege, described in Part II of this Article, 
are occasionally effective – but imperfect – attempts to provide this 
protection.  As seen in the Genesco case, cybersecurity work is 
protected only to the extent that it could be associated with legal 
advice or defense.  To be sure, cybersecurity does involve legal 
considerations; however, cybersecurity should be driven by the 
ultimate desire to protect a company’s networks and systems, and to 
remediate any damage caused by security incidents. Companies 
should feel certain that if they engage a cybersecurity consultant, that 
consultant’s work product and communications will be confidential; 
companies should not feel obligated to limit the cybersecurity 
consultant’s work so that it falls squarely under the attorney-related 
privileges.  Such a legal framework ultimately discourages companies 
from fully investing in cybersecurity.  This result clearly is contrary to 
the public interest.   
 The cybersecurity privilege finds support in the two leading 
jurisprudential theories that underlie privilege law: utilitarian theory 
and privacy theory.117  
 The utilitarian approach is most commonly associated with the 
four-prong test articulated by John Henry Wigmore in his treatise, 
Wigmore on Evidence:  
 
 
 
 
117 Daniel Northrop, The Attorney Client Privilege and Information Disclosed to an 
Attorney with the Intention that the Attorney Draft a Document to be Released to Third 
Parties: Public Policy Calls for at Least the Strictest Application of the Attorney-Client 
Privilege, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1481, 1492-93 (2009) (“Several theories have been 
proposed to justify the attorney-client privilege. The utilitarian rationale and the privacy 
rationale are two predominant theories that provide a logical explanation for why the 
attorney-client privilege should and does exist.”).  
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1. The communications must originate in a confidence 
that they will not be disclosed; 
2. This element of confidentiality must be essential to the 
full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation 
between the parties; 
3. This relation must be one which in the opinion of the 
community ought to be sedulously fostered;  
4. The injury that would inure to the relation by the 
disclosure of the communications must be greater than 
the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of 
the litigation.118 
 A cybersecurity privilege would satisfy all four requirements of 
Wigmore’s utilitarian test.  First, communications between companies 
and their cybersecurity experts are conducted in confidence; it is 
difficult to conceive of a company that would share its network 
vulnerabilities, suspected incidents, defense strategies, and related 
information unless it was assured confidentiality.  Second, that 
confidentiality is essential to the relationship; without this 
information, a cybersecurity professional would have difficulty 
performing basic analysis.  Third, the public has great interest in 
ensuring the security of the networks and systems in which 
individuals entrust some of their most sensitive information.  
 The privacy approach to privilege law “emphasizes that human 
autonomy, respect for relationships, and respect for the bonds and 
promises that protect shared information are important values that 
must be protected,”119 and that compelled disclosure results in “(1) the 
embarrassment of having secrets revealed and (2) the forced 
revelation of confidential information.”120 The utilitarian approach, 
rather than the privacy approach, is more directly applicable to a 
cybersecurity privilege for corporations.  The attorney-client privilege 
and work product doctrine, for instance, are typically justified for 
 
 
 
 
118 John Henry Wigmore, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2285 (1961).  
119 Northrop, supra note 117 at 1495. 
120 Id. 
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corporations under a utilitarian argument.121  However, a common-
law cybersecurity privilege finds some support in the privacy-based 
approach to privilege law.  Cybersecurity professionals have access to 
a great deal of consumer personal information, such as customer 
purchasing data, employee web browsing histories, and, in some 
cases, employee disciplinary records.  Accordingly, there is a great 
privacy interest in ensuring that the data that cybersecurity 
professionals access and receive is private. 
 Opponents of a cybersecurity privilege likely would argue that 
cybersecurity is a brand-new field that is not deserving of common-
law evidentiary protection.  To be sure, courts are very reluctant to 
create new evidentiary privileges, and there is a strong presumption in 
favor of presenting evidence to a court.122  However, cybersecurity is 
not a passing fad.  As our personal and professional lives are 
increasingly tied to the Internet and other computer networks and 
systems,123 the concerns about the security of the information 
described in Part I of this Article will continue.  Even if “cybersecurity” 
becomes replaced with a new term in the next few decades, it is 
difficult to conceive of a modern world in which courts and 
policymakers are not concerned about the security of data, systems, 
and networks.  Under Federal Rule of Evidence 501, courts must 
determine whether the public good served by a cybersecurity privilege 
outweighs the standard presumption in favor of requiring testimony 
and evidence in court.   
 To illustrate why the cybersecurity privilege is justified under the 
common law, the remainder of this section describes some of the most 
directly applicable common-law privileges – for psychotherapists, 
 
 
 
 
121 Catherine T. Struve, Attorney-Client and Work Product Protection in a Utilitarian 
World: An Argument for Recomparison, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1697, 1703 (1995). (“Although 
scholars once used a rights-based analysis to justify the individual’s attorney-client 
privilege, few attempted to do so for corporate clients. Critics of a corporate attorney-client 
privilege note that corporations have no claim to the personal rights that underpin the 
attorney-client privilege.”).  
122 See University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 US 182, 189 (1990) (“We do not create and 
apply an evidentiary privilege unless it promotes sufficiently important interests to 
outweigh the need for probative evidence.”) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
123 Bill Wasik, In the Programmable World, All of Our Objects Will Act as One, WIRED 
(May 14, 2013) (“In our houses, cars, and factories, we’re surrounded by tiny, intelligent 
devices that capture data about how we live and what we do. Now they are beginning to 
talk to one another. Soon we’ll be able to choreograph them to respond to our needs, solve 
our problems, even save our lives.”). 
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attorneys, and clergy124 – and explains how the underlying rationale 
for these privileges applies to cybersecurity work.  
1. Psychotherapist Privilege 
 In Jaffee, the Supreme Court recognized a common-law privilege 
for communications between psychotherapists and their patients.125  
The Court held that “confidential communications between a licensed 
psychotherapist and her patient in the course of diagnosis or 
treatment are protected from compelled disclosure under Rule 501 of 
the Federal Rules of Evidence.”126 
 The Court recognized the “significant public and private interests” 
supporting such a privilege.127  Without a psychotherapist privilege, 
the Court reasoned, “confidential conversations between 
psychotherapists and their patients would surely be chilled, 
particularly when it is obvious that the circumstances that give rise to 
the need for treatment will probably result in litigation.”128  The 
“mental health of our citizenry,” the Court concluded, “is a public good 
of transcendent importance.”129 
 The Court’s reasoning in support of a psychotherapist privilege 
also counsels in favor of a cybersecurity privilege.  In Jaffee, the 
Court’s ultimate decision to recognize a privilege was based largely on 
an assessment of the public good that is served by encouraging 
confidential communications between patients and psychotherapists.  
The Court correctly concluded that effective psychotherapy “depends 
upon an atmosphere of confidence and trust in which the patient is 
 
 
 
 
124 This article does not focus on the spousal testimonial or marital communications 
common law privileges, see Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980), as those 
privileges arise from a familial and personal bond that is not analogous to the relationship 
between a company and a cybersecurity professional. See Mikah K. Story, Twenty-First 
Century Pillow-Talk: Applicability of the Marital Communications Privilege to Electronic 
Mail, 58 S.C. L. REV. 275, 281 (2006) (“[U]nlike the other evidentiary privileges, there is no 
professional party in the marital relationship who can advise the communicating party of 
the existence of the privilege.”).  
125 Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 11. 
126 Id. at 15. 
127 Id. at 11. 
128 Id. at 11-12.  
129 Id. at 11. 
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willing to make a frank and complete disclosure of facts, emotions, 
memories, and fears.”130 Although cybersecurity consulting is quite 
different from psychotherapy, both depend on an atmosphere of 
candor and trust.  Cybersecurity professionals must have unfettered 
access to a company’s confidential computer systems, and learn about 
vulnerabilities that could cause a company to go out of business.  
Companies and their employees are unlikely to provide cybersecurity 
professionals with such broad access if there is a chance that the 
information could later be used against them in court by plaintiffs or 
regulators.  
 Like cybersecurity, modern psychotherapy did not exist during the 
development of the common law.  Indeed, in his dissent in Jaffee, 
Justice Scalia noted that “[f]or most of history, men and women have 
worked out their difficulties by talking to, inter alios, parents, siblings, 
best friends, and bartenders – none of whom was awarded a privilege 
against testifying in court.”131  Yet the majority in Jaffee focused not 
on the history of the use of psychotherapy.  Instead, the Court 
recognized a privilege after analyzing the current public value of 
ensuring confidentiality during psychotherapy.  Likewise, although 
the term “cybersecurity” did not exist at common law – and was not 
widely recognized until recent years – courts should evaluate the 
benefits of providing a privilege based on the current public interest 
in allowing confidentiality for cybersecurity professionals and their 
clients.  
2. Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Doctrine 
 The rationale in support of the attorney-client privilege and work 
product doctrine, discussed above, also supports a stand-alone 
cybersecurity privilege.  
 According to Wigmore, the attorney-client privilege dates back to 
Eighteenth Century England: “In order to promote freedom of 
consultation of legal advisers by clients, the apprehension of 
compelled disclosure by the legal advisers must be removed; and 
hence the law must prohibit such disclosure except on the client’s 
consent.”132  United States courts quickly adopted a strong privilege 
for attorney-client communications.  In 1851, the New York Supreme 
 
 
 
 
130 Id. at 10.  
131 Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 22 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
132 Wigmore on Evidence § 2291.  
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Court recognized the attorney-client privilege, reasoning that “[i]f the 
facts thus communicated were liable to be extorted from the attorney 
or counsel, suitors would hesitate to employ them, to the great 
inconvenience of the court.”133  The United States Supreme Court 
acknowledged the attorney-client privilege in 1888, when Chief 
Justice Fuller wrote that the privilege “is founded upon the necessity, 
in the interest and administration of justice, of the aid of persons 
having knowledge of the law and skilled in its practice, which 
assistance can only be safely and readily availed of when free from the 
consequences or the apprehension of disclosure.”134  The Court has 
continued to recognize a broad attorney-client privilege.  In Upjohn v. 
United States, the Court stated that the privilege’s purpose “is to 
encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their 
clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the 
observance of law and administration of justice.”135   
 In short, courts and commentators have focused on the public 
good that is served by promoting a close and confidential professional 
relationship between attorneys and their clients.136  Courts have long 
recognized that without the privilege, attorneys could not fully meet 
their obligations to serve their clients.  Attorneys might choose to 
avoid asking certain questions or researching certain aspects of the 
case; otherwise they could discover information that could later be 
used against their clients.  Likewise, cybersecurity professionals must 
be able to conduct broad-based inquiries of their clients’ systems and 
information processing practices in order to gain a full understanding 
of vulnerabilities or a suspected data security event.  Discouraging a 
cybersecurity professional from conducting a comprehensive 
evaluation surely would not serve the public interest.  It likely would 
lead to continued vulnerabilities.  
 
 
 
 
133 Rochester City Bank v. Suydam, Sage & Co., 5 How. Pr. 254 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1851).  
134 Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888).  
135 Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389 (1981); see also Trammel, 445 U.S. at 51 (1980) (“The lawyer-
client privilege rests on the need for the advocate and counselor to know all that relates to 
the client's reasons for seeking representation if the professional mission is to be carried 
out.”).  
136 Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client 
Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1073 (1976) (“When I say the lawyer is his client’s legal friend, 
I mean the lawyer makes his client’s interests his own insofar as this is necessary to 
preserve and foster the client’s autonomy within the law.”). 
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 Likewise, the rationale for the work-product doctrine supports a 
cybersecurity privilege.  In Hickman, the Supreme Court observed 
that, in order to prepare a client’s case, an attorney must “assemble 
information, sift what he considers to be the relevant from the 
irrelevant facts, prepare his legal theories and plan his strategy 
without undue and needless interference.”137  Attorneys’ work, the 
Court wrote, “is reflected, of course, in interviews, statements, 
memoranda, correspondence, briefs, mental impressions, personal 
beliefs, and countless other tangible and intangible ways[.]”138  
Allowing opposing counsel to access such work product would result 
in “[i]nefficiency, unfairness, and sharp practices,” and “the interests 
of the clients and the cause of justice would be poorly served.”139  
Cybersecurity professionals, like attorneys, frequently conduct 
interviews, research facts, and document their thoughts in 
memoranda and reports.  Just as the Court recognized that the work-
product doctrine encourages attorneys to produce such sensitive work, 
a cybersecurity privilege would encourage cybersecurity professionals 
to produce reports without fear of those materials later being subject 
to discovery.  
3. Priest-Penitent Privilege 
 Although clergy members and cybersecurity professionals play 
very different roles in society, the fundamental reasons for the priest-
penitent privilege also support the creation of a cybersecurity 
privilege. 
 The first known United States court opinion to recognize the 
priest-penitent privilege was the 1813 case, People v. Phillips.140 In 
that case, the New York Court of General Session refused to require a 
priest to testify about a congregant’s statement in a confessional, 
holding that protecting communications with clergy is essential for 
free exercise of religion: 
 
 
 
 
137 Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511. 
138 Id.  
139 Id. 
140 People v. Phillips, N.Y.Ct.Gen.Sess. (1813), as reported in Privileged Communications 
To Clergymen, 1 Cath. Lawyer 199, 207 (1955). 
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The sacraments of a religion are its most important 
elements. We have but two in the Protestant Church — 
Baptism and the Lord's Supper — and they are 
considered the seals of the covenant of grace. Suppose 
that a decision of this court, or a law of the state should 
prevent the administration of one or both of these 
sacraments, would not the constitution be violated, and 
the freedom of religion be infringed? Every man who 
hears me will answer in the affirmative. Will not the 
same result follow, if we deprive the Roman catholic of 
one of his ordinances? Secrecy is of the essence of 
penance. The sinner will not confess, nor will the priest 
receive his confession, if the veil of secrecy is removed: 
To decide that the minister shall promulgate what he 
receives in confession, is to declare that there shall be 
no penance; and this important branch of the Roman 
Catholic religion would be thus annihilated.141 
 The United States Supreme Court adopted this reasoning, 
recognizing a broad privilege for communications with clergy.142 Chief 
Justice Burger wrote that the priest-penitent privilege is “rooted in the 
imperative need for confidence and trust” and “recognizes the human 
need to disclose to a spiritual counselor, in total and absolute 
confidence, what are believed to be flawed acts or thoughts and to 
receive priestly consolation and guidance in return.”143  The privilege 
is absolute and rarely subject to debate.144  
 To be sure, clergy and cybersecurity professionals receive very 
different types of information.  A clergy member may receive an 
individual’s most intimate, personal confessions, while cybersecurity 
professionals may learn of a company’s network vulnerabilities, or 
incidents that have compromised consumers’ personal information 
but were not required to be reported to regulators or individuals.  
 
 
 
 
141 Id. 
142 Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1875) (“[S]uits cannot be maintained which 
would require a disclosure of the confidences of the confessional[.]”). 
143 Trammel, 445 U.S. at 51 (1980). 
144 Developments In The Law — Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1450, 1556 
(1985) (“Neither scholars nor courts question the legitimacy of the privilege, and attorneys 
rarely litigate the issue.”). 
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Although the type of information is quite different, the need to protect 
both secrecies can be great.  The clergy member may receive 
information that could upend an individual’s personal life or even lead 
to a criminal conviction.  The cybersecurity professional could learn 
information that could destroy a company’s reputation, potentially 
driving it out of business.  Just as Chief Justice Burger recognized that 
clergy must be able to guarantee “total and absolute confidence,”145 so 
too must cybersecurity professionals.  
B. Statutory Privilege 
 If courts decline to recognize a common-law privilege for 
cybersecurity professionals, state legislatures and Congress may 
ultimately choose to promulgate statutes or evidentiary rules that 
protect cybersecurity work product and communications.146  
 Among the most analogous statutory privileges is the accountant-
client privilege.  At the federal level, courts have not recognized a 
common-law privilege for accountant communications or work 
product.147  However, the Internal Revenue Code provides a privilege 
to “communication between a taxpayer and any federally authorized 
tax practitioner to the extent the communication would be considered 
a privileged communication if it were between a taxpayer and an 
attorney.”148  However, this privilege only applies to noncriminal tax 
matters before the Internal Revenue Service or in federal court, and 
only applies to law-related accounting work.149  Many state 
 
 
 
 
145 Trammel, 445 U.S. at 51.  
146 See Sohoni, supra note 111 at 499 (“Congress does, on occasion, involve itself in 
expressly articulating rules of privilege and . . . such privileges supplement those developed 
by the federal courts under Rule 501.”).  
147 See Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973) (“[W]e note that no confidential 
accountant-client privilege exists under federal law, and no state-created privilege has been 
recognized in federal cases[.]).  
148 26 U.S.C. 7525(a)(1).  
149 See United States v. BDO Seidman, 337 F.3d 802 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Thus the § 7525 
privilege is no broader than that of the attorney-client privilege, and nothing in § 7525 
suggests that nonlawyer practitioners are entitled to privilege when they are doing other 
than lawyers’ work.  Because the scope of the tax practitioner-client privilege depends on 
the scope of the common law protections of confidential attorney-client communications, 
we must look to the body of common law interpreting the attorney-client privilege to 
interpret the § 7525 privilege.”) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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legislatures have enacted even stronger statutory privileges that 
prevent accountant work product or communications from being 
disclosed in state court.150  Accountants, like cybersecurity 
professionals, obtain broad access to their clients’ information in 
order to assess potential problems and take the necessary remedial 
action.  The accountant-client privilege serves the public interest by 
encouraging confidential and open information-sharing between the 
client and the accountant, and enabling the accountant to provide 
candid advice based on this information.151  Accordingly, arguments 
that have convinced legislators to enact an accountant-client privilege 
could be equally persuasive for a cybersecurity privilege; in both 
instances, society as a whole benefits from a statute that promotes a 
close, trusting relationship between the professional and client. 
 Similarly, physician-patient privilege statutes have been enacted 
for many of the same reasons that legislators would enact a 
cybersecurity privilege.  Although federal courts recognize a common-
law privilege for communications between psychotherapists and their 
patients, they do not recognize a similar privilege for communications 
between physicians and patients.152  However, most states have 
 
 
 
 
150 See Pilar Mata and Melissa J. Smith, Demystifying Accountant-Client Privileges in 
State Tax Litigation, TAX ANALYSTS (Apr. 4, 2012) (“Although Congress created a federal 
tax practitioner privilege that protects accountants' confidential tax advice when litigating 
against the Internal Revenue Service, the federal tax practitioner privilege will not protect 
communications between accountants and their clients when matters are litigated in state 
courts. It is thus critical for taxpayers to determine the existence and scope of state 
privileges that can be used to protect state-tax-related communications between taxpayers 
and their accountants.”). See, e.g., Calif. Revenue and Taxation Code 7099.1 (“With respect 
to tax advice, the protections of confidentiality that apply to a communication between a 
client and an attorney, as set forth in Article 3 (commencing with Section 950) of Chapter 4 
of Division 8 of the Evidence Code, also shall apply to a communication between a taxpayer 
and any federally authorized tax practitioner to the extent the communication would be 
considered a privileged communication if it were between a client and an attorney.”). 
151 Thomas J. Molony, Is the Supreme Court Ready to Recognize Another Privilege?  An 
Examination of the Accountant-Client Privilege in the Aftermath of Jaffee v. Redmond, 55 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 247, 271-72 (1988) (“Perhaps the most compelling argument in favor 
of the accountant-client privilege is that it will encourage full disclosure and allow public 
accountants to better serve both their clients and the public. The thrust of this argument is 
that protection of accountant-client communications promotes an atmosphere of 
confidence and trust which motivates clients to reveal more information to their 
accountants. Accountants are then able to evaluate the information to determine if it 
requires disclosure.”).  
152 See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 602 (1977) (“The physician-patient evidentiary 
privilege is unknown to the common law.”); United States v. Bek, 493 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 
2007) (“[W]e can find no circuit authority in support of a physician-patient privilege, even 
after Jaffee.”).  
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enacted statutes that provide a physician-patient privilege.153  
Supporters of the physician-patient privilege argue that “trust is 
conducive to the patient’s seeking and receiving treatment,” and 
therefore “the patient must be assured that his confidences will be 
kept.”154  Just as the physician is the “trustee by necessity of the 
patient’s secrets,”155 the cybersecurity professional is entrusted with a 
company’s secrets about its data security and other network and 
systems vulnerabilities.   
 Likewise, most states have enacted statutes that provide a 
qualified privilege that prevents journalists from being compelled to 
reveal the identities of their confidential sources.156  Although some 
jurisdictions provide limited protection to journalists and their 
sources under the First Amendment or common law, that protection 
often is weak – or, in some jurisdictions, non-existent.157  To fill those 
gaps, state legislatures have passed shield laws that strengthen these 
protections and provide journalists and their sources with more 
certainty as to whether the journalist could be subpoenaed to reveal 
the source’s identity in open court.158  States have enacted shield laws 
largely in recognition of the unique role that journalists play in 
 
 
 
 
153 See Laural C. Alexander, Should Alabama Adopt a Physician-Patient Evidence 
Privilege? 45 ALA. L. REV. 261, 266 (1994).   
154 Daniel W. Shuman, Origins of the Physician-Patient Privilege and Professional Secret, 
39 S.W. L.J. 661, 682 (1985) (“A disclosure of confidential information would forfeit the 
patient’s confidence in the physician, breach the physician’s duty as trustee by necessity, 
and cause people with embarrassing diseases not to seek treatment.”).   
155 Id.  
156 For a comprehensive list of state shield laws, see The Reporter’s Privilege, Reporters 
Committee for Freedom of the Press, available at www.rcfp.org/reporters-privilege.  
157 See Anthony L. Fargo, Analyzing Federal Shield Law Proposals: What Congress Can 
Learn from the States, 11 COMM. L. & POL’Y 35, 39 (2006) (“Over the next thirty-plus years, 
most of the federal appellate courts at least tacitly supported journalists’ rights to refuse to 
testify or provide other evidence if the information subpoenaed was not highly relevant, 
critical or unavailable elsewhere. Some federal appellate courts have even extended 
protection for journalists to include nonconfidential material – such as outtakes, 
unpublished photographs, and notes – that was not obtained through a promise of 
confidentiality.”).   
158 Id. at 49 (“[W]hile a shield law may not be a panacea for problems between the press 
and the legal system, it can provide relatively consistent treatment within a jurisdiction.”).  
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society, and the important role that confidentiality plays in the 
journalistic process.159 
 In short, even if courts decline to recognize a cybersecurity 
evidentiary privilege under federal or state common law, Congress 
and state legislatures have great discretion to codify a cybersecurity 
privilege in a statute.  Indeed, legislators have a long history of 
recognizing important public policy reasons in support of the creation 
of a new privilege.  The rapid growth of cybersecurity threats – and 
the harm that they cause to individuals, companies, and the 
government – provides legislators with a good reason to consider the 
creation of a standalone cybersecurity privilege.  Such protection 
would help to build the trust and confidence necessary for 
cybersecurity professionals to remediate harm and prevent future 
incidents.  
IV. THE CONTOURS OF A CYBERSECURITY PRIVILEGE 
 If courts or legislators decide to create a cybersecurity privilege, 
such a privilege should be broad enough to encourage companies to 
hire cybersecurity consultants both before and after data security 
incidents.  
A. Who is Covered by the Cybersecurity Privilege? 
 Among the primary issues that arise with a cybersecurity privilege 
is how to define the professionals who are covered by the privilege.  
Unlike attorneys, who are certified by a single, government-authorized 
bar in each state, cybersecurity does not have a unitary certification.  
Granted, there are a number of cybersecurity certifications, many of 
which require rigorous training and examination.  Perhaps the best-
known certification is the Certified Information Systems Security 
Professional (CISSP), which requires at least five years of paid, full-
 
 
 
 
159 See Stephanie B. Turner, Protecting Citizen Journalists: Why Congress Should Adopt a 
Broad Federal Shield Law, 30 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 503, 507 (2012) (“Lawmakers 
generally cite two related rationales for enacting a reporter’s privilege. First, without the 
privilege, journalists would write with a more restrained pen, and fear of exposure would 
cause dissidents to communicate less openly to trusted reporters. By encouraging sources 
to give and journalists to disseminate information freely, the privilege encourages the free 
flow of information to the public and ensures a robust marketplace of ideas. Second, 
without the privilege, journalists would be reduced to an investigative arm of the 
government. By allowing journalists to operate independently, the privilege creates a 
fourth institution outside the Government as an additional check on the three official 
branches.”) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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time work experience in two or more of eight cybersecurity domains, 
and passage of a six-hour exam.160  They also must meet certain 
criminal history requirements and enroll in continuing education.161 
 At first glance, it appears reasonable to apply a cybersecurity 
privilege only to CISSP holders.  However, CISSP is not the only 
credential that is valuable for cybersecurity professionals.162  For 
instance, the International Association of Privacy Professionals offers 
privacy-focused credentials including the Certified Information 
Privacy Professional (“CIPP”),163 Certified Information Privacy 
Manager (“CIPM”),164 and Certified Information Privacy Technologist 
(“CIPT”).165  ISACA offers the Certified Information Systems Auditor 
(“CISA”) credential, which focuses on systems audit, control, and 
security.166  And the EC-Council offers the Certified Ethical Hacker 
(“CEH”) credential.167  Moreover, many technology vendors, such as 
Cisco, offer vendor-specific security certifications.168 
 
 
 
 
160 See How to Get Your CISSP Certification, (ISC)2, https://www.isc2.org/cissp-how-to-
certify.aspx (last visited Mar. 8, 2016). 
161 See Woody Leonhard, Is CISSP Certification Worth the Effort, INFOWORLD (Aug. 1, 
2012).  
162 See id. (“While CISSP is considered by many to be the premiere certification in the field, 
it’s by no means the only one, and there’s no rule that says you can hold only one.”).  
163 See Certification Programs, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF PRIVACY PROFESSIONALS, 
https://iapp.org/certify/programs (last visited Mar. 8, 2016) (“The CIPP shows that you 
understand the laws, regulations and standards of privacy in your jurisdiction or 
discipline.”).  
164 See id. (“The CIPM says that you understand how to use process and technology to 
manage privacy in an organization—regardless of the industry or jurisdiction.”).  
165 See id. (“The CIPT shows that you know how to manage and build privacy requirements 
and controls into technology.”).  
166 How to Become CISA Certified, ISACA, http://www.isaca.org/Certification/CISA-
Certified-Information-Systems-Auditor/How-to-Become-Certified/Pages/default.aspx 
(last visited Mar. 8, 2016).  
167 CEH: Certified Ethical Hacking, EC COUNCIL, 
http://www.eccouncil.org/Certification/certified-ethical-hacker (“The definition of an Ethical 
Hacker is very similar to a Penetration Tester. The Ethical Hacker is an individual who is usually 
employed with the organization and who can be trusted to undertake an attempt to penetrate 
networks and/or computer systems using the same methods and techniques as a Hacker.”).  
168 See Carolyn Duffy Marsan, How to Land a Cybersecurity Job, NETWORK WORLD (May 
3, 2012) (“Vendor-specific certifications from Cisco, RSA, Symantec and others are also in 
demand.”).  
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 All of these credentials have some value for cybersecurity. A CISSP 
could provide expeditious incident response after a data breach.  A 
CIPP or CIPM could help set cybersecurity policies.  A CISA could 
conduct routine cybersecurity audits.  And a CEH could creatively 
determine a system’s vulnerabilities. Moreover, a certification alone 
may not be sufficient to prepare an individual to provide cybersecurity 
services.169 Limiting the cybersecurity privilege to one or some of these 
certifications could both exclude some professionals who provide 
cybersecurity services while unnecessarily including people who have 
certifications but do not provide relevant cybersecurity services. 
 Rather than focusing on credentials, as with the attorney-client 
privilege, the cybersecurity privilege should be functional.  The 
privilege should apply to the work product and communications of 
professionals engaged in the protection of communications systems 
and networks, and the information contained therein.  Such a 
functional definition would broadly encompass the work and 
communications of cybersecurity professionals.  At the same time, the 
privilege would exclude the non-cybersecurity work of professionals 
who also happen to perform cybersecurity-related functions.  For 
instance, assume an auditing firm conducts both a cybersecurity and 
financial audit of a corporate client.  Under my proposed privilege, 
only the firm’s cybersecurity-related audit work would be protected 
from discovery. 
 Courts have long taken a functional approach to evidentiary 
privileges.  For instance, a common debate about shield laws and 
privileges for journalism focuses on the definition of “journalist.”170  
Federal courts have long determined that the privilege applies to 
journalists who “obtained the information in the course of gathering 
news for publication.”171 State shield laws also apply broadly to 
journalists, but only in their capacity gathering information for 
 
 
 
 
169 See Amber Corrin, Is Cybersecurity the Right Job for You, FCW (Jan. 23, 2014) (“It’s 
not something you can just get a certificate for and check that box on your resume.”).  
170 Stephen Bates, The Reporter’s Privilege, Then and Now, HARV. KENNEDY SCHOOL (Jan. 
1, 2000), available at http://shorensteincenter.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/03/r23_bates.pdf (“The law has no trouble deciding who is an 
attorney or a doctor.  Defining a journalist is dicier.  Courts and legislatures have had to 
decide whether the privilege extends to freelancers, magazine reporters, book authors, 
pamphleteers, Internet journalists, and scholars.”).  
171 Von Bulow by Auersperg v. Von Bulow, 811 F. 2d 136, 144 (2d Cir. 1987).  
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publication.172 Likewise, the cybersecurity privilege should focus on 
the task being performed by the professional, rather than the 
professional’s certification, education, job title, or other formal 
qualifications.  
 Indeed, the Supreme Court embraced such a functional approach 
in Jaffee, which involved communications with a social worker.  The 
Court declined to limit the psychotherapist privilege to licensed 
psychiatrists and psychologists, concluding that the “reasons for 
recognizing a privilege for treatment by psychiatrists and 
psychologists apply with equal force to treatment by a clinical social 
worker.”173  The Court extended the privilege to a clinical social worker 
because she provided psychotherapy services.  Similarly, a consultant 
or other professional should be subject to the cybersecurity privilege 
based on the nature of the services provided to the client. 
B. What is Covered by the Cybersecurity Privilege? 
 I propose that, subject to narrow exceptions, the cybersecurity 
privilege provide absolute protection to both the communications and 
work product of cybersecurity professionals. Only broad protection 
would provide the necessary assurance to encourage companies to 
allow cybersecurity professionals to access and evaluate their systems 
and networks.  
 A privilege may either be absolute or qualified. A qualified 
privilege is triggered only after a court conducts a balancing test and 
determines that application of the privilege in that instance is in the 
public interest and outweighs the need for the evidence.174 A qualified 
 
 
 
 
172 See, e.g., Cal. Evid. Code § 1070(a) (“A publisher, editor, reporter, or other person 
connected with or employed upon a newspaper, magazine, or other periodical publication, 
or by a press association or wire service, or any person who has been so connected or 
employed, cannot be adjudged in contempt by a judicial, legislative, administrative body, 
or any other body having the power to issue subpoenas, for refusing to disclose, in any 
proceeding as defined in Section 901, the source of any information procured while so 
connected or employed for publication in a newspaper, magazine or other periodical 
publication, or for refusing to disclose any unpublished information obtained or prepared 
in gathering, receiving or processing of information for communication to the public.”) 
(emphasis added).  
173 Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 15.  
174 Eileen A. Scallen, Relational and Informational Privileges and the Case of the 
Mysterious Mediation Privilege, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 537, 548 (2004). (“Moreover, the 
protection is qualified, and if there is, among other factors, a sufficient showing of 
relevance, need for information, or seriousness of the issues involved, the trial judge may 
order the production of the information.”). 
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privilege does not provide the necessary assurances to encourage 
companies to hire cybersecurity consultants.  For instance, in Upjohn, 
the Supreme Court rejected a lower court’s qualified attorney-client 
privilege, concluding that only an absolute privilege provides the 
necessary confidentiality guarantees to clients and attorneys.175  
Likewise, the Court declined to adopt a qualified psychotherapist 
privilege, concluding that “[m]aking the promise of confidentiality 
contingent upon a trial judge's later evaluation of the relative 
importance of the patient's interest in privacy and the evidentiary 
need for disclosure would eviscerate the effectiveness of the 
privilege.”176 
 I propose that cybersecurity professionals’ work product – and not 
just their communications – be covered by an absolute privilege.  
Granted, the attorney work-product doctrine is a qualified privilege 
that can be overcome by a showing of need or hardship.177  However, 
the work product of cybersecurity professionals differs from that of 
attorneys. Cybersecurity professionals often are hired to uncover 
vulnerabilities in a company’s computer systems and networks.  Their 
work may be entirely unrelated to pending or ongoing litigation.  The 
end goal of a cybersecurity professional is not only to reduce a 
company’s legal liability (though that is part of the goal); it is to 
protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its client’s 
computers, systems, networks, and information.  In turn, part of the 
cybersecurity professional’s goals is to protect the information of the 
company’s consumers, employees, and others.  Unlike an attorney, 
whose allegiance is clearly to the client, the cybersecurity 
professional’s goals are much broader.  There is a strong public 
interest in encouraging companies to hire cybersecurity professionals 
to engage in this work.   
 Of course, the cybersecurity privilege should not be a means to 
allow companies to conduct illegal activities, such as violating 
computer hacking laws.178  Accordingly, I propose that, as with the 
 
 
 
 
175 Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 393 (“[I]f the purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to be served, 
the attorney and client must be able to predict with some degree of certainty whether 
particular discussions will be protected. An uncertain privilege, or one which purports to 
be certain but results in widely varying applications by the courts, is little better than no 
privilege at all.”).  
176 Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 17-18.  
177 See Section II.B, supra. 
178 See 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (criminalizing the intentional access of computers without 
authorization or in excess of authorization).  
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attorney-client privilege,179 the cybersecurity privilege should not 
protect communications or work product that are used to commit or 
further crime or fraud.  If a cybersecurity professional helps a client 
“hack back” at an attacker, in violation of federal or state anti-hacking 
laws, the cybersecurity privilege should not prevent the cybersecurity 
professional’s work product or communications from being 
discovered in court.  
 Moreover, it may very well be that an absolute privilege – at least 
initially – is not feasible due to resistance from courts or legislators.  
In that case, a qualified privilege would be an acceptable starting 
point.  Although it would not provide the same broad range of 
protections as an absolute privilege, it would help to encourage 
companies to invest in cybersecurity work and increase the likelihood 
that the cybersecurity professionals’ work product would be protected 
from discovery.  
CONCLUSION 
 As cybersecurity has emerged as a vital and necessary service, 
companies have struggled to figure out how to prevent the work of 
cybersecurity professionals from being subject to discovery.  The 
makeshift solution has been to create the illusion that cybersecurity 
work is done at the direction of attorneys, and therefore is subject to 
attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine.  This solution 
is inefficient, as it requires attorneys to be the middleman between 
companies and cybersecurity professionals.  The solution also is 
illusory: it requires attorneys with little technical expertise to 
“supervise” the work of experienced cybersecurity professionals.   
 The cybersecurity privilege provides a more logical and efficient 
solution.  And it is a solution that is grounded in strong public policy.  
Just as courts and legislatures have recognized privileges for 
attorneys, accountants, priests, and journalists, they have good reason 
to provide evidentiary protection that promotes the use of 
cybersecurity professionals.  A cybersecurity privilege would allow 
companies to invest in cybersecurity without fear that the investments 
would lead to evidence that would later be used against them in court.     
 
 
 
 
 
179 United States v. Zolin, 491 US 554, 563 (1989) (“It is the purpose of the crime-fraud 
exception to the attorney-client privilege to assure that the seal of secrecy between lawyer 
and client does not extend to communications made for the purpose of getting advice for 
the commission of a fraud or crime.”) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).   
  
